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Abstract
This paper uses the simple geometry of the classic, open-economy trilemma
to introduce a new gauge of the stability of international macroeconomic ar-
rangements. The new stability gauge reflects the simultaneity of a country’s
choices of exchange rate fixity, financial openness, and monetary sovereignty.
So, the new gauge is bounded and correspondingly non-Gaussian. We use
the new stability gauge in nonlinear panel estimates to examine the post-
Bretton Woods period, and we find that trilemma policy stability is linked
to official holdings of foreign exchange reserves in low income countries.
We also find that the combination of fixed exchange rates and financial
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market openness is the most stable arrangement within the trilemma; and
middle-income countries have less stable trilemma arrangements than either
low or high-income countries. The paper also characterizes international
macroeconomic arrangements in terms of their semblance to definitive pol-
icy archetypes; and, it uses the trilemma constraint to provide a new gauge
of monetary sovereignty.
Keywords: Trilemma, Foreign Exchange Rate Regimes, Exchange Rates,
International Reserves, Financial Openness, Fear of Floating, Monetary
Sovereignty
1. Introduction
The classic, open-economy trilemma tells us that a country cannot si-
multaneously achieve exchange rate stability, capital market openness, and
monetary sovereignty. Choosing, say, to peg an exchange rate means choos-
ing to give up some degree of monetary sovereignty, capital market openness,
or both. While the trilemma demands that such choices be made, the choices
are never final.2 This paper introduces a new, formal measure of the sta-
bility – or instability – of such arrangements. Based on the constraints of
the trilemma itself, the new measure is bounded and drawn from a non-
Gaussian distribution. As measured here, trilemma policy changes are thus
themselves non-normal. This paper uses the new measure to describe the
2That exchange rate arrangements are not permanent has been highlighted by recent
history, emphasized by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), and further explored in Calvo and
Reinhart (2002), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzeneger (2005), and
Ilzetzki et al. (2011). Those papers, among others, document the sometimes dramatic
changes in de facto exchange rate regimes. In this paper, we build on such studies of
exchange rate stability by encompassing all three legs of the trilemma, rather than just
the exchange rate itself.
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incidence of policy changes during the post-Bretton Woods period, and it
explores the policy changes further using nonlinear panel estimates.
The new measure of stability starts with the simple geometry of the
trilemma. We can think of a country’s international macroeconomic ar-
rangements in terms of locations in a constrained three-dimensional policy
space, one that is defined by exchange rate stability, financial openness, and
monetary policy sovereignty. In this framework, the change in a country’s
arrangement is naturally measured as a movement from one point to an-
other in the three-dimensional policy space. So, the stability or instability
of a country’s arrangements is reflected in the extent of the changes over
time: it is measured by the distances between the sequential locations in
the policy space. A stable arrangement is defined as one with relatively
small movements within the policy space, while large movements within the
policy space represent unstable arrangements.
We also provide a new measure of monetary sovereignty. While there are
several existing approaches to measuring capital mobility and exchange rate
policy, that is not the case for monetary sovereignty. The extant literature
has only one well-used approach to measuring sovereignty. That approach
relies on the correlation between a country’s interest rate and the interest
rate of a base country. One drawback to using such correlations is that they
often conflate monetary dependence with other sources of shared dynamics.
The new measure presented here does not use interest rate correlations. In-
stead, it is derived from the trilemma’s constraint. The trilemma constrains
monetary sovereignty at the expense of exchange rate stability and finan-
cial openness. So, given measures of exchange rate stability and financial
openness, the trilemma’s constraint implicitly provides a measure of mone-
tary sovereignty. This new, implicit measure complements the now-standard
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interest rate correlation approach.
We use the trilemma stability and monetary sovereignty measures to ex-
plore which types of trilemma policies are most stable and to study whether
official foreign exchange reserves are related to greater trilemma stability.
In the next section of this paper, we introduce our new measures, first of
stability then of monetary sovereignty. We then use the measures to as-
sess the stability of the trilemma policies in the modern era. Next, we sort
countries into policy archetypes in each year and explore the stability of the
archetypes. Finally, we examine the links between stability, archetype, and
official holdings of foreign reserves.
2. Two New Measures
2.1. A Stability Measure
To gauge stability, we begin with the international trilemma’s standard
triad of policies. We denote the ith country’s extant regime in period t as
Ri,t, where:
Ri,t = (Si,t, Fi,t,Mi,t),
and Si,t represents exchange rate stability, Fi,t represents financial openness,
and Mi,t represents monetary sovereignty. The measures of Si,t, Fi,t, and
Mi,t, are normalized so that each falls between zero and one (inclusive);
and values of one represent perfectly fixed exchange rates, perfectly open
financial markets, and perfectly sovereign monetary policy. So, a pure fix
with open financial markets is: Ri,t = (1, 1, 0); a pure fix with monetary
sovereignty is Ri,t = (1, 0, 1), and a pure float with open capital markets
and monetary sovereignty is Ri,t = (0, 1, 1).
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In this framework, a change in a country’s regime from one period to
the next is simply the vector connecting the two consecutive points in the
policy space:
ri,t = Ri,t−Ri,t−1 = (si,t, fi,t,mi,t) = (Si,t−Si,t−1, Fi,t−Fi,t−1,Mi,t−Mi,t−1).
Using this vector of policy changes, ri,t, we can definitively measure the
overall change in policy using the vector’s norm, ||ri,t||.3 Using the norm,
we define a single, univariate measure adjusted to fall between zero and one:
ni,t =
||ri,t||√
2
.
This adjusted norm, ni,t, captures in a simple scalar the full extent of the
change in a country’s triad of policies. A value of ni,t equal to zero would
mean that a country has not changed its three policies since the previous
year. In contrast, a large value of ni,t would reflect a substantial change
relative to the prior year.
By reducing three dimensions to one, the norm gauges the stability be-
tween periods of the triad of policies within the trilemma. That said, the
measure has two potential conceptual drawbacks. First, it requires that we
make an assumption about the functional form of the trade-offs between
policies. While most open-economy macroeconomic models implicitly in-
3We use the familiar l2-norm, or Euclidean norm. That is, we use: ||ri,t|| = (spi,t +
fpi,t+m
p
i,t)
1
p , with p = 2. However, we also calculate the taxi norm, p = 1, and the infinity
norm, p = ∞. Despite their different intuitive interpretations (the Euclidean norm is the
distance ‘as the crow flies,’ the taxi norm adds up the full change in each dimension, and
the infinity norm takes the largest move in any of the dimensions), the kernel densities
of these norms are similarly shaped, and the full sample estimates reported in the panel
results below are not sensitive to the use of these alternative norms. We refer to the the
l2-norm as “the” norm in the rest of the paper.
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clude the trilemma as an arbitrage-like condition, various models differ in
terms of the functional forms they would imply for the trade-offs among the
policies. In this paper, we assume that the trilemma constraint is a linear
one in the normalized units that we adopt.4 This assumption has the virtue
of simplicity, and it is supported empirically by Aizenman et al. (2008) and
Wu (2011). The second potential drawback is that, while the norm provides
a gauge of policy stability that reflects the idea that no single policy can be
changed on its own, it does not, by itself, retain information about which
of the two or three policies has changed. This second drawback can be ad-
dressed by using the norm in conjunction with other data. For example, in
the empirical work below, we combine the observations of the norm with
observations of the trilemma’s individual pieces.
By providing a univariate gauge of multivariate changes in policies, our
new measure reflects the spirit of the Girton and Roper (1977) ‘exchange
market pressure’ measure. Their measure provided an early, univariate
amalgam of foreign exchange policies. Our measure is a similar amalgam,
one that now has a geometric interpretation within the well-known trilemma.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 1 illustrates our approach to measuring policy stability. The figure
displays the two data points underlying a single observation of the adjusted
norm, ni,t.
5 The observation is for Indonesia at the time of the Asian Crisis
(i = Indonesia, and t = 1997), and the underlying data are from Aizenman,
Chinn, and Ito (2010), which we discuss in more detail in section 3.1.6 As is
4That is, the trilemma can be viewed as a triangular surface in three dimensional space,
as illustrated in Online Appendix Figure A1.
5Note that the linear version of the trilemma constraint would require that all points
lie on the plane defined by the three points: (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1), and (1, 1, 0).
6This figure uses our new, implicit measure of monetary sovereignty, also described
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well-known, Indonesia experienced a substantial increase in its exchange rate
variability and a small reduction in its financial openness during the crisis,
while it increased its monetary sovereignty considerably. These changes
are indicated in the figure by the vector shown between the observations for
1996 and for 1997.7 The normalized length of the vector measures the overall
change in the policy triad. The norm in 1997 is about five times the values
typical of Indonesia earlier in the decade, and it exceeds (by a substantial
margin) 95 percent of the values in the sample. After introducing the data,
in section 3, we provide additional figures and summary statistics.
In general, the norm of the vector summarizes the overall changes in
the policies of the trilemma. Below, we use the norm (adjusted to fall
between zero and one) to examine the stability of various policies and to
assess the extent to which stability may be linked to official holdings of
foreign exchange reserves.
2.2. An Implicit Measure of Monetary Sovereignty
The most often-used measure of monetary sovereignty relies on the ap-
proach of Shambaugh (2004). That approach reflects the correlation between
a country’s domestic, short-term interest rate and that of a putative base
country, often the United States. High correlations are taken as indicative
of monetary dependence. That is, they are taken as a lack of monetary
sovereignty. The drawback of this otherwise valuable approach is that, in
addition to monetary dependence, the measure also captures the interest
rate effects of the underlying circumstances to which independent monetary
below.
7The cartesian coordinates (Si,t, Fi,t,Mi,t) are (0.66, 0.94, 0.4) for 1996 and (0.11, 0.88,
1.0) for 1997. So, ni,t = 0.578.
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policies may or may not respond. So, at one extreme, even a country with
complete monetary sovereignty appears otherwise when it is subject to some
of the same shocks or influences as its putative base country. At the other
extreme, a country with no monetary sovereignty might misleadingly appear
to be quite autonomous when it is subject to disturbances not experienced
by its base country.
New Zealand provides a telling example of the standard measure’s prob-
lem. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand is the prototypic inflation targeter.
While it could conceivably be influenced by the policies of Australia (its
“base country” in Shambaugh’s work), it is in no way constrained by Aus-
tralia’s policies. Nevertheless, the interest rates of New Zealand and Aus-
tralia are – as one might expect – often highly correlated. So, taken at
face value, the standard approach might wrongly seem to suggest that New
Zealand’s monetary policy is dictated by the Reserve Bank of Australia.
Other researchers, such as Frankel et al. (2004), and Reade and Volz
(2010), allow for more general dynamic links between the interest rates of
the countries. However, even these more general measures ultimately rely
on interest rate comovements, so they are subject to the same drawback.8
Here, we introduce an alternative measure of monetary sovereignty that
does not suffer from this drawback, and we use the new measure of sovereignty
in our gauge of stability, ni,t. Our new measure of sovereignty starts from the
trilemma itself. Specifically, we maintain our assumption that the trilemma
8Three other, more recent studies take important steps toward mitigating the problem.
Duburcq and Girardin (2010) allow domestic monetary conditions to matter in a study of
eight Latin American countries over eleven years. Bluedorn and Bowdler (2010) separate
the anticipated and unanticipated components of the base country’s interest rate changes
using the U.S. as the base country. Herwartz and Roestel (2010) examine long-run interest
rate dependence and condition on domestic variables for a panel of 20 small, high income
countries.
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holds linearly. With that assumption, the existing measures of exchange rate
stability, Si,t, and of financial openness, Fi,t, provide us with a very simple,
implicit measure of monetary sovereignty, Mi,t. Specifically, the implicit
measure of monetary sovereignty is:
Mi,t = 2− Si,t − Fi,t.
Using data from Aizenman et al. (2010), described in more detail below,
Figure 2 depicts both this new measure (the blue lines) and the interest rate
correlation measure (the red lines).9 Looking at the means, shown in the
first row, the new, implicit measure suggests a greater degree of monetary
sovereignty than does the interest rate measure. However, underlying these
means are individual instances of differences in both directions, as show in
the figure’s middle row.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
For some economies, especially for those that peg exchange rates or main-
tain them in a narrow band, the new measure often indicates that there
is less sovereignty than would be suggested by the interest rate correlation
measure. This is the case for Hong Kong, shown in the row’s first chart.
The Hong Kong Monetary Authority tightly controls the value of exchange
rate, and capital is allowed to move into and out of its economy relatively
freely.10 The trilemma tells us that in such cases there is little scope for
9In cases where the implicit measure would yield a value in excess of one, we have
equated the measure with one. The imposition of this limit reflects the fact that countries
not pursuing exchange rate stability and financial openness to the fullest extent neverthe-
less cannot acquire more than complete (Mi,t = 1) monetary sovereignty.
10The Hong Kong Monetary Authority has assiduously pegged the Hong Kong dollar to
the U.S. dollar since the eighties, and the United States is the base country in Shambaugh
(2004).
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monetary sovereignty, and in 2010 (the latest year in our sample), the new,
implicit measure of sovereignty equals zero. In contrast, differences in the
behavior of U.S. and Hong Kong interest rates at times give rise to much
higher correlation-based measures of sovereignty despite the tight peg. Hong
Kong’s correlation-based measure for 2010 is 0.45, a value that would seem
to suggest that Hong Kong retained a good deal of monetary sovereignty,
more so even than Australia.11 Throughout all of Hong Kong’s peg, the new,
trilemma-implied sovereignty measures indicate that Hong Kong’s monetary
sovereignty was more limited than the interest rate correlations would have
suggested.
For still other countries, the two sovereignty measures are quite similar;
and, the measures occasionally are even identical. For example, both mon-
etary sovereignty measures assign values of zero to eurozone economies in
recent years, as illustrated by Austria, shown in the row’s next chart.12
In some cases, the the new, implicit measure is much larger than the
existing, correlation-based measure. For example, returning to the case
of New Zealand, shown next, the 2010 interest rate correlation measure
is only 0.17, a value that would seem to suggest that the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand follows the monetary policies of Australia. In contrast,
New Zealand’s new, trilemma-based measure is much higher, 0.71, which
reflects its substantial degree of monetary sovereignty. Similarly, Canada’s
monetary sovereignty (now also used to target inflation) is largely masked
by the interest rate measure, which remains low as long as Canadian and
U.S. interest rates continue to be relatively highly correlated. Canada’s
11Australia’s 2010 correlation-based measure was 0.37.
12In this chart, one can also see the onset of Austria’s informal monetary union with
Germany in 1981.
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measures are shown in the row’s last chart. For 2010, Canada’s interest
rate correlation-based measure is a modest 0.29, while the implied trilemma
measure is 0.72.
Overall, the sample correlation between the trilemma-based sovereignty
measure and the interest rate correlation-based sovereignty measure is 0.37.
The sample correlation between the two measures is higher for high income
countries, where it equals 0.53. It is lowest, 0.15, for middle income coun-
tries; and it is 0.21 for low income countries.
The final row of Figure 2 shows the average changes in the two monetary
sovereignty measures. The blue lines depict the changes in the new, implicit
measure; and the red lines depict the changes in the interest rate correlation
measure. Using the new monetary sovereignty measure, it is now easy to
see the monetary upheaval many countries (especially the high income ones,
shown in the lower left) experienced in the wake of the Bretton Woods break-
down. By comparison, the correlation-based measures would have suggested
that the rich countries experienced only modest changes in their monetary
sovereignty. In more recent years, we see that changes in the correlation-
based measures suggest a loss in sovereignty among low and middle income
economies that does not appear so striking in the new measure.
As might be expected, the sample correlation between the changes in the
two sovereignty measures is much smaller (0.04) than the sample correlation
of their levels. The pattern across the income groups, however, remains the
same. At 0.08, the correlation between the changes in the two measures is
highest for the high-income group. The middle-income group has the lowest
correlation, 0.02; while the correlation in the low-income group equals the
average, 0.04.
Overall, while there are some exceptions (such as the Bretton Woods
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breakdown), both the standard deviations in Table 1 and the plots in Figure
2 suggest that the new, implicit measure is somewhat less variable than the
old one. That is, using the new, implicit measures, the greater relative
sovereignty is ccompanied by a greater steadiness as well.
3. Data and Overall Trilemma Stability
3.1. Data Definition and Descriptive Statistics
In this section, we calculate the new measures of trilemma stability using
a sample of 177 economies with annual data from 1970 through 2010. We
begin with the data provided in Aizenman et al. (2010), updated with the
latest version of the de jure financial account openness measure of Chinn
and Ito (2006). Then, we recalculate our measure of trilemma stability using
our new, implicit gauge of monetary sovereignty.
Aizenman et al. (2010) construct the annual measure of Si,t, using the
exchange rate’s monthly standard deviation against a base country.13,14 Like
many other researchers, they follow Shambaugh (2004) in constructing mon-
etary sovereignty measures, Mi,t, using the correlation between each coun-
try’s money market interest rate and that of its base country. Their measure
13Aizenman et al. (2010) provide a continuous measure of Si,t that does not rely on the
use of reserves to categorize exchange rate regimes. Other prominent de facto measures of
exchange rate arrangements include: Shambaugh (2004), and later Klein and Shambaugh
(2008), who classify exchange rate arrangements into floating and non-floating; Reinhart
and Rogoff (2004), and more recently Ilzetzki et al. (2011), who rely on exchange rate
behavior and more nuanced assessments to construct five coarse and many finer categories;
and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzeneger (2005), who use information about exchange rates and
about reserves to provide a cluster-based exchange rate taxonomy.
14Like others, Aizenman et al. (2010) apply a threshold to the standard deviation
method in order to allow for currencies that remain in narrow bands; and, they also
allow for individual devaluations or revaluations. The base countries include Australia,
Belgium, France, Germany, India, Malaysia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
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of financial market openness, Fi,t, is a de jure one: essentially, it is a weighted
average of the International Monetary Fund’s indicators of exchange restric-
tions.15
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the adjusted norms, ni,t, calcu-
lated using these data and reported separately for each of the two sovereignty
measures. Note that it is the stability of policy that is the focus here, not
the stability of the exchange rate. In particular, a sustained float – with
its inherent exchange rate volatility – can be part of a stable policy.16 The
first panel reports the statistics by income group, while the second panel
reports them by decade.17 The third panel provides the measures for the
policy archetypes that are described later in this section. Finally, the bottom
panel provides the summary statistics for the sample as a whole.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The first two columns of numbers report the mean and median for each cat-
15Specifically, Chinn and Ito (2006) measure financial openness with the first principal
component of the IMF’s binary indicators of restrictions on current and capital account
transactions, of multiple exchange rates, and of the required surrender of export proceeds.
This is also the measure subsequently used by Aizenman et al. (2010). Miniane (2004)
provides a de jure index that uses finer IMF data on capital account restrictions, but the
data are available for only thirty countries. Many other, related, de jure indices have
been developed, but few blend the easy interpretation and the wide coverage that Chinn
and Ito (2006) provide. The natural alternative is to use actual capital flows as de facto
measures of financial openness. However, actual flows are quite volatile from period to
period, arguably too volatile to be accurately representing the generally slower moving
changes in the underlying policies that are of interest to us here.
16To see that a stable policy does not need a stable exchange rate, consider Canada,
which has had a floating exchange rate and open capital market for more than two decades.
Throughout this period, its exchange rate has fluctuated, but its policy of floating exchange
rates and open capital markets has remained the same.
17While we examine the full sample of countries, we note that rich economies, middle-
income economies, and poor economies differ from one another in many ways that are
neither well measured nor well understood. So, imposing constancy may entail question-
able restrictions (even when unconditional distributions look broadly similar). Separating
the income groups is the simplest way to allow them to differ. The income groupings are
available at www.worldbank.org.
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egory. In all cases, and using both measures, the means exceed the medians.
As we will see with more detail below, this reflects the fact that distribu-
tions are skewed to the left and bounded from below by zero. The middle
income countries have both the highest means and the highest median.18
The norm’s maximum values are given in the next column. The largest
value, 0.94, belongs to a middle income country: Mexico, which in 1976
abruptly ended its peso fix in exchange for greater monetary sovereignty.
The standard deviations show that the norms vary widely throughout all of
the subsamples.
The table also provides measures of skewness and kurtosis. As can be
seen in the labeled columns, the norms, regardless of how they are split,
appear to be strongly leptokurtotic and positively skewed. This can be
seen more clearly in Figure 3. The top chart plots non-parametric kernel
density estimates of the distributions of the norm for each of the three income
groups, and the bottom chart provides comparable plots for each decade in
the sample. Both charts show plainly that there are many observations
where trilemma policy changes are either small or zero. While very small
values are slightly more predominant in the high-income economies, they
are prevalent across all three income groups. Likewise, we see a greater
concentration of small values in the eighties and the naughts that in the
other decades, but the skewness and leptokurtosis are striking in all decades.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 4 graphs the means of the norms over time. The top four charts plot
the norms for each of the income groups; and, the red lines show the mean
adjusted norms constructed using the interest rate correlation measure of
18However, Hodges and Lehmann (1963) estimates of the median differences are all zero.
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sovereignty, while the blue lines use the new, implied trilemma measure of
sovereignty.19
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Overall, the trilemma policies appear to be more stable when that stability
is assessed using the new, trilemma-implied monetary sovereignty measure.
However, both measures allow us to see the rise in policy changes in low
and middle income countries in the nineties – around the time of the Asian
financial crisis. Likewise, both measures clearly indicate the policy insta-
bility occurring in high-income countries after the fall of Bretton Woods.
Throughout most of the remainder of the paper we calculate the norms
using the new, trilemma-implied measure of monetary sovereignty.20
3.2. Archetypes
Next, we explore how the norms differ across the types of trilemma ar-
rangements. We assign observations to four different types of arrangements
based on their semblance to one of four “archetypes:” a ‘Hong-Kong ’ type,
19Online Appendix Table A1 splits the sample according to the dates of some of the
key crises that occur during the period: the Mexican Crisis (1994), the Southeast Asian
Crisis (1997), and the Argentine Crisis (2002). Summary statistics are provided for each
of the subsamples. For the high-income countries, the table reports lower means, medians,
maxima, and standard deviations in the later part of the sample than in the early part,
regardless of where the split is made. However, the estimated Hodges-Lehmann differences
in medians again all equal zero, and the differences for the other income groups are less
uniform.
20At times, it is the very large changes in policy that are of most interest. So, we sep-
arately examine the incidence of large observations. Online Appendix Table A2 provides
data on the largest decile of adjusted norms. The table lists the number of these large
observations in each year, by income group and for the full sample. In each cell within
the table, the numerator gives the number of the large observations, while the denomina-
tor gives the total number of observations. Overall, the pattern of large policy changes
follows the pattern of the means. The richest economies have the fewest large changes in
their trilemma policies, while the middle-income group has the highest proportion of large
changes.
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with exchange rate stability and open capital markets; a ‘China’ type, with
exchange rate stability and monetary sovereignty; a ‘U.S.’ type with open
financial markets and monetary sovereignty; and a ‘Middle’ type, with a
modest degree of all three characteristics.
We use the simple geometry of the trilemma to describe the types of ar-
rangements more precisely. Letting j = ‘Hong Kong ’, ‘China’, ‘U.S.’, ‘Mid-
dle’, we define typej such that Rj takes on the values: (1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1),
(0, 1, 1), and (23 ,
2
3 ,
2
3). Each of these four values of Rj represents a point on
the frontier of the feasible set defined by the trilemma. The first three points
represent the three corners corresponding to the ‘Hong Kong,’ ‘China,’ and
‘U.S.’ archetypes described above, and the last point represents the ‘Middle’
of the feasible frontier. Then, we define country i ’s type in period t by its
proximity to one of the four points. Specifically, we let:
j = argmin
j
||(Ri,t −Rj)||
typei,t
def
= typej .
That is, the observation’s type is defined by the one that minimizes the
distance between the observation and the archetype.21
Throughout much of the modern period, the most common arrangement
in this taxonomy is the ‘China’ type, with its relatively stable exchange
rates and a relatively high degree of monetary sovereignty. The second
most common arrangement type is the ‘Middle.’ The number of ‘Middle’
21Using this definition of assigned types, Figure A2 in the online appendix shows the
number of economies in each year of each type. In our sample, the observations of the
Chinese, Hong Kong, and U.S. economies do not precisely mimic the zero or one values of
their corresponding archetypes, but they are close.
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observations rose through the early nineties as many ‘China’ type economies
began to relax some of their capital controls. The number of economies of
the ‘Hong Kong ’ type has been rising fairly steadily since the nineties. The
number of economies of the ‘U.S.’ type has risen throughout the period,
though less steadily.22
[INSERT FIGURE A2 ABOUT HERE]
Next, we examine the stability of the archetypes by looking at the norms in
each category. Specifically, for each observation, we note the archetype and
observe the extent of the trilemma policy change over the subsequent year.
The third panel of Table 1 summarizes the adjusted norm for the four
types of arrangements. As shown, the economies that fall within the fixed
exchange rate archetypes, ‘China’ and ‘Hong Kong ’, are the ones that have
the smallest means and medians.23 Notably, the median of the observations
in the ‘Hong Kong ’ archetype is zero. Underlying this statistic is the fact
that about two-thirds of the norms in the Hong Kong ’ category are zero.24
22These findings can be interpreted as confirmation that there has been no sustained
‘hollowing out of the middle,’ where the ‘middle’ is now defined in the three-dimensional
context of the trilemma. Suggested first in the nineties, the ‘hollowing out’ argument
was that increasing capital mobility would make intermediate exchange rate regimes un-
sustainable; so governments would be forced to choose between zero and full exchange
rate stability. Frankel et al. (2001) and others later refuted the argument empirically by
noting that policies of modest exchange rate stability were holding their own against the
extremes of fixity and floating. The bulk of the literature focused exclusively on the single
dimension of exchange rate policy. Here, one can define the ‘middle’ and the ‘poles’ in
terms of all three policy dimensions we likewise find that the hollowing out idea is not
supported. The approach builds on the findings of Aizenman, Chin, and Ito, who show
that emerging market economies have moved toward a blend of policies.
23Hodges-Lehmann estimates (not reported in the table) of the pseudo median differ-
ences between each archetype and the remainder are nonzero for all four categories.
24Note that there is nothing inherent in the ‘Hong Kong’ type that necessitates that
it is the most stable policy configuration. We can see this by way of example. Con-
sider Argentina in 2001, when it was characterized as a ‘Hong Kong’ type in 2001. This
archetype’s policy triad was not sustained. Although Argentina retained a fixed exchange
17
That is, economies with relatively fixed exchange rates and open capital
markets often keep their policies the same from one year to the next. Cor-
respondingly, ‘Hong Kong ’ is also the archetype with the greatest leftward
skewness, shown in the designated column. The ‘China’ archetype, which
has relatively closed financial markets, is also heavily skewed to the left,
with a low median, and many (about forty percent) of its norms equal to
zero. The ‘U.S.’ archetype, in which exchange rates are flexible and finan-
cial markets are open, and the ‘Middle’ archetype, which has some of that
openness and flexibility, have higher means and medians. That is, not only
do these last two archetypes have more variable exchange rates, they also
have more variable trilemma policies.
The bottom rows of Figure 4 illustrate how stability has changed over the
modern period for each of the archetypes. Despite the obvious peaks in the
mean adjusted norms of the ‘China’ and ‘Hong Kong ’ archetypes in the late
nineties, these archetypes (which have exchange rate stability in common)
exhibit the smallest overall policy changes; and, their relative stability has
been largely sustained throughout the global financial crisis. While the
norms of the ‘U.S.’ archetype countries have fallen over the modern era as
a whole, they – along with the norms of the ‘middle’ category – have been
relatively high.
4. Panel Regressions
This section uses panel estimates to explore the relationship between
stability and the underlying trilemma policies. The bounded nature of the
rate between 2001 and 2002, it changed its financial openness and monetary sovereignty
considerably, which gave it a large norm: ni,t = 0.59. This value differs only slightly from
Indonesia’s large norm at the time of the Asian Crisis.
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adjusted norm raises a number of econometric issues that render the use
of linear models potentially problematic.25 Papke and Wooldridge (2008)
propose a solution to this problem in a panel context, and the estimation here
relies on their approach. Their solution employs a generalized estimation
equation (GEE) in a balanced panel.
Using this approach, two specifications are estimated with a balanced
panel of 96 countries between 1985–2010.26 Both specifications relate the
norm to the underlying trilemma policies and to official holdings of foreign
exchange reserves.27
The first specification relates the adjusted norm to past reserves and
past measures of exchange rate stability and of financial openness. The
second specification also includes lagged reserves, but instead of including
the measures of exchange rate stability and openness, it includes dummies
for the economy’s lagged archetype.
Specifically, GEE estimates are provided for two versions of Papke and
Wooldridge’s (2008) fractional panel model:
E(nit|xi1, . . . ,xiT ) = Φ(κt + xitβ + x¯iλ)
where xit is the vector of explanatory variables; x¯i is the corresponding
vector of country-specific means; κt, β, and λ are scaled coefficients; and, the
time subscript in κt indicates the use of a complete set of time dummies. The
25For details see Papke and Wooldridge (1996).
26An online appendix lists the countries that are included in the balanced panel.
27The consideration of reserves reflects a long tradition of studying their links to
trilemma policies. Beginning with the early work on optimal reserves in a stochastic
setting (for example: Kenen and Yudin (1965) and Heller (1966)), economists have mod-
eled reserves as potentially reducing the probability or cost of devaluations, of speculative
attacks, and of sudden stops. Their inclusion here allows for such a role. Data are taken
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
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inclusion of x¯i allows for time-constant, unobserved country effects that may
be related to our other regressors, while it avoids the incidental parameters
problem raised by cross-sectional dummies in this context.28 In the first
specification, xit = [ρi,t−1, si,t−1, fi,t−1]; and, in the second specification,
xit = [ρi,t−1, D‘China’,i,t−1, D‘HongKong’,i,t−1, D‘U.S.’,i,t−1], where ρ is the ratio
of official reserves to GDP, and Dj indicates a dummy variable for typei,t =
Rj .
29
Panel estimates are first presented using the full range of policy changes,
and the three income groups are treated separately. The focus then turns to
large policy changes exclusively, where ‘large’ is defined in terms of several
cutoffs of the value of the norm.
4.1. Estimation by Income Group
The top two panels of Table 2 provide the estimation results from the
two specifications for each income group. The top panel gives the estimates
from the specification using the exchange rate stability and financial market
openness as regressors; and, the second panel gives the estimates from the
specification that makes explicit use of the archetypes. Each pair of columns
gives the estimated coefficients, along with their standard errors – which are
robust to second order misspecification – and the partial effects, averaged
across the population (APEs), with bootstrapped standard errors.30
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The results for low-income economies are given in the first pair of columns;
and, the first row in each panel gives the estimates for reserves as a fraction
28Lancaster (2000) provides a survey of the literature on the incidental parameters
problem.
29Note that R‘Middle’ is subsumed by the constants in the second specification.
30For a discussion of APEs, see chapter 2 in Wooldridge (2010).
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of GDP. In both specifications, the estimated coefficients are negative and
statistically significant at the five percent level. The estimated APEs, which
(unlike the raw coefficients) can be compared across specifications, are of
roughly similar magnitudes: 0.34 in the first specification and 0.40 in the
second. These estimates imply that in low-income economies greater reserves
tend to come with greater trilemma policy stability.
The low-income estimates for the first specification’s remaining variables,
the degree of exchange rate stability and the degree of financial openness,
are given with their standard errors in the subsequent rows of the top panel.
None is statistically significantly different from zero at any standard confi-
dence level. The low-income archetype estimates are given in the remaining
rows of the second panel. As shown, the coefficient on the ‘Hong Kong’
archetype is positive and mildly statistically significant. This implies that
(conditional on reserves), the combination of open capital markets and fixed
exchange rates does not represent a particularly stable policy configuration
among low income economies.
The next pair of columns provides the estimates for the middle income
economies. Here, reserves are no longer statistically significant. However, in
the first specification, we see that (in the third row) exchange rate stability
has a negative coefficient and is mildly significant. That is, conditional on
the reserves and the degree of financial openness, we are somewhat more
likely to find smaller policy disruptions in middle-income economies when
they have relatively more stable exchange rates. In the second specification,
we see that the middle-income coefficient on the ‘USA’ archetype is positive
and and mildly significant. That is, conditional on reserves and financial
openness, larger policy changes are found here when exchange rates are
flexible. The positive coefficient (implying a higher norm) on the ‘U.S.’
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archetype in this specification goes hand in hand with the negative coefficient
(implying a lower norm) on exchange rate stability in the first specification.
The third pair of columns gives the estimates for the high-income economies.
The estimated coefficients on reserves are positive and significant in both
specifications. In the first specification, the estimated coefficient on ex-
change rate stability is negative, as it is in for middle-income economies, and
here it is statistically significant at the one percent level. Correspondingly,
in the second specification, the coefficient on the ‘Hong Kong’ archetype is
negative and statistically significant at all confidence levels.
Finally, the last pair of columns gives the estimates for the full sample.
Taken as a whole, reserves lose all significance in the first specification, but
the estimated coefficient on exchange rate stability is negative and signifi-
cant. Likewise, the coefficient on reserves is small and insignificant in the
second specification, but the coefficient on the ‘Hong Kong’ archetype is
again negative and strongly statistically significant.
4.2. Large Norms
The bottom of the table provides the results from the same specifications
estimated only for ‘large’ policy changes. The first pair of columns report es-
timates using norms from the top decile of the distribution; and, subsequent
columns provide estimates where the definition of ‘large’ is broadened to
include additional deciles, until all the values of the norm above the median
are included.
The first row of each panel again gives the estimated reserve parame-
ters. In both specifications, and for all definitions of ‘large’, the estimated
coefficients on reserves are negative, though there is only mild statistical sig-
nificance for the top decile estimates, and none elsewhere. Recall that the
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APE estimates, unlike the raw coefficient estimates, can be compared across
specifications. In the first specification the estimated APE is −0.37, and in
the second specification it is −0.42. These values do not differ markedly
from the earlier low-income APE estimates of −0.34 and −0.40.
The negative link between reserves and trilemma stability that we see
here in times of instability, and for low-income economies, may reflect a
greater incidence of limitations on governments’ access to international fi-
nancial markets. With limited access to credit, the governments in such
economies must rely more heavily on their own reserves when funds are
needed to smooth policies.31
The estimates for exchange rate stability and financial market openness
are given next. The estimated exchange rate stability coefficients are uni-
formly positive for the large norms. That is, there is some tendency to find
large policy changes in conjunction with greater exchange rate stability.
These positive estimates contrast with the negative full sample estimates
above. The statistical significance of the exchange rate is limited here to the
samples that include the top 30 percent and the top 40 percent. One pos-
sible interpretation of these results is that fixed exchange rates are usually
part of relatively stable policies, but when they are associated with policy
changes, those changes are somewhat large.
The estimated coefficients on financial market openness are given next.
The coefficients again are all negative; and they are significant here at the
one percent level for all but the top decile. This tells us that, conditional
on reserves and the degree of exchange rate stability, trilemma policies are
31As mentioned above, such policy smoothing is typically optimal in models with convex
policy costs. See, for example, Pina (2012) for a model of developing country reserves in
a monetary policy context.
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more stable when financial markets are open.
Among the archetypes, given next, only the ‘China’ estimates are statis-
tically significant at standard confidence levels. The ‘China’ estimates are
uniformly positive, and they are statistically significant for all definitions
of ‘large’, except the top decile. The positive ‘China’ coefficients echo the
earlier findings for exchange rate stability and financial openness in that the
‘China’ archetype represents the combination of relatively stable exchange
rates and relatively closed financial markets. That is, both these qualities
are associated with relatively large policy changes.
5. Conclusions
Underlying this paper is a willingness to use the constraint of the clas-
sic, open-economy trilemma and to draw out some of its implications for
empirical work on the stability of trilemma policies. The simple geometry
of the trilemma is used to provide a univariate gauge of the stability of a
country’s multidimensional international macroeconomic policies. The new
gauge is bounded by the constraints of the trilemma itself, and it is non-
Gaussian. Most importantly, the distribution is asymmetric. Future studies
of trilemma policy stability – whether studies of its determinants or its con-
sequences – should recognize and incorporate this fundamental asymmetry.
In addition to the new trilemma stability gauge, the paper provides a
new, implicit measure of monetary sovereignty; and it illustrates a frame-
work for characterizing international macroeconomic arrangements in terms
of their semblance to definitive policy archetypes. The monetary sovereignty
measure is constructed from the trilemma’s constraint in conjunction with
existing measures of exchange rate stability and international financial open-
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ness. The international macroeconomic policy characterizations stem from
their positioning within the trilemma’s policy space.
The paper’s approach and its resulting measures are used here to char-
acterize the international macroeconomic arrangements of the modern era.
The measures indicate that international macroeconomic policies have been
most stable in settings of relatively fixed exchange rates and open financial
markets. Using the new monetary measures, it appears that for many coun-
tries monetary sovereignty has been both somewhat greater and somewhat
less erratic than previously had been thought. Finally, when attention is
restricted to large policy changes or to low-income economies, the stability
of international macroeconomic policies also appears to be linked to official
holdings of foreign exchange reserves.
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Figure 1: Indonesia 1996–97. The figure displays the two data points underlying a single
observation of the adjusted norm, ni,t. As is well-known, Indonesia experienced a substan-
tial increase in its exchange rate variability and a small reduction in its financial openness
during the crisis, while it increased its monetary sovereignty considerably. These changes
are indicated by the vector shown between the observations for 1996 and for 1997. The
normalized length of the vector measures the overall change in the policy triad.
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A. ON-LINE APPENDIX
Table A1: Norms Before and After Recent Crises
Group Mean Median Max. Min. St. Dev. Skew. Kurt. Obs.
1971–1994 LIC 0.09 0.02 0.69 0.00 0.14 2.18 8.00 689
MIC 0.11 0.05 0.94 0.00 0.16 2.11 7.49 1390
HIC 0.10 0.06 0.77 0.00 0.13 2.08 8.56 818
All 0.10 0.05 0.94 0.00 0.15 2.17 8.12 2897
1995–2010 LIC 0.11 0.06 0.76 0.00 0.13 1.72 6.32 618
MIC 0.11 0.06 0.88 0.00 0.14 1.93 7.23 1431
HIC 0.07 0.03 0.68 0.00 0.10 1.97 7.38 789
All 0.10 0.05 0.88 0.00 0.13 1.98 7.63 2838
1971–1997 LIC 0.10 0.03 0.69 0.00 0.14 2.01 7.15 790
MIC 0.12 0.05 0.94 0.00 0.16 2.00 6.99 1617
HIC 0.11 0.06 0.77 0.00 0.13 2.00 8.32 938
ALL 0.11 0.05 0.94 0.00 0.15 2.05 7.61 3345
1998–2010 LIC 0.10 0.05 0.76 0.00 0.13 1.86 7.10 517
MIC 0.10 0.06 0.88 0.00 0.14 2.06 8.02 1204
HIC 0.06 0.02 0.68 0.00 0.10 2.23 8.60 669
All 0.09 0.05 0.88 0.00 0.13 2.12 8.47 2390
1971–2002 LIC 0.10 0.04 0.76 0.00 0.14 1.97 7.15 975
MIC 0.11 0.06 0.94 0.00 0.16 2.00 7.07 2057
HIC 0.10 0.06 0.77 0.00 0.12 1.98 8.09 1178
All 0.11 0.06 0.94 0.00 0.15 2.05 7.65 4210
2003–2010 LIC 0.09 0.05 0.72 0.00 0.12 1.86 6.93 332
MIC 0.10 0.05 0.88 0.00 0.13 2.09 8.50 764
HIC 0.05 0.01 0.68 0.00 0.09 2.56 11.48 429
All 0.08 0.04 0.88 0.00 0.12 2.19 9.07 1525
Note: The table splits the sample according to the dates of some of the key crises that occur during the period: the
Mexican Crisis (1994), the Southeast Asian Crisis (1997), and the Argentine Crisis (2002). Summary statistics
are provided for each of the subsamples. For the high-income countries, the table reports lower means, medians,
maxima, and standard deviations in the later part of the sample than in the early part, regardless of where the
split is made.
Table A2: Norm Values in the Last Decile by Income Group
Year Low Income Middle Income High Income All
1971 9/26 12/48 9/29 30/103
1972 3/27 8/48 3/29 14104
1973 8/28 12/50 13/30 33/107
1974 4/27 4/51 3/31 11/110
1975 2/27 4/49 5/31 11/107
1976 4/26 7/51 4/31 15/108
1977 1/26 2/52 6/34 9/112
1978 4/26 7/53 4/36 15/115
1979 1/26 8/53 4/36 13/115
1980 1/27 7/55 2/36 10/118
1981 1/27 7/56 1/36 9/119
1982 3/30 9/58 1/37 13/125
1983 3/31 9/63 3/37 15/131
1984 3/31 4/65 2/37 9/133
1985 1/33 8/66 1/37 10/136
1986 4/33 7/70 3/37 14/140
1987 1/33 6/70 0/39 7/142
1988 1/33 2/70 2/39 5/142
1989 3/35 8/71 1/39 8/145
1990 2/35 5/72 1/39 9/146
1991 2/34 5/73 2/39 9/146
1992 2/34 10/73 1/39 13/146
1993 1/34 12/73 5/40 18/147
1994 5/34 13/74 3/40 21/148
1995 6/33 8/75 0/40 14/148
1996 6/34 14/78 2/40 22/152
1997 4/35 15/88 4/48 23/171
1998 2/37 10/88 6/48 18/173
1999 3/38 15/88 4/48 22/174
2000 8/38 12/89 0/48 20/175
2001 3/37 8/87 5/48 16/172
2002 4/37 6/86 1/48 11/171
2003 4/38 8/87 2/48 14/173
2004 2/38 9/87 2/48 13/173
2005 5/37 6/87 1/47 12/172
2006 1/37 5/84 3/47 9/168
2007 4/36 4/84 2/48 10/167
2008 1/36 17/83 3/48 21/167
2009 6/37 10/83 1/48 17/168
2010 5/36 3/83 1/47 9/166
Total 131/1,307 326/2,821 116/1,607 573/5,735
(%) 10.0 11.5 7.2 10.0
Note: Norm values over 0.2753 are in the last decile in the sample. Each numerator gives
the number of such norms in the relevant portion of the sample, while the denominator
gives the corresponding number of countries. Overall, the pattern of large policy changes
follows the pattern of the means. The richest economies have the fewest large changes in
their trilemma policies, while the middle-income group has the highest proportion of large
changes.
Table A3: Descriptive Statistics of Trilemma-Implied Norms by Country
Mean Median Max. Min. St. Dev. Skew. Kurt.
Algeria 0.09 0.08 0.24 0.01 0.06 0.71 3.21
Argentina 0.18 0.11 0.68 0.00 0.21 1.53 3.96
Austria 0.05 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.09 1.84 4.87
Bahamas, The 0.01 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.05 4.80 24.04
Bangladesh 0.17 0.19 0.42 0.00 0.14 0.23 1.92
Barbados 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.07 3.18 11.08
Belgium 0.07 0.02 0.54 0.00 0.13 2.44 8.24
Benin 0.01 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.05 4.80 24.04
Bolivia 0.14 0.06 0.67 0.00 0.16 1.80 5.95
Botswana 0.15 0.16 0.32 0.01 0.09 0.12 1.85
Brazil 0.12 0.08 0.55 0.00 0.12 2.08 7.58
Burundi 0.10 0.08 0.34 0.01 0.08 1.50 4.78
Cameroon 0.03 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.08 2.41 6.80
Canada 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.65 2.85
Central African 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.07 3.18 11.08
Chad 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.07 3.18 11.08
Chile 0.13 0.07 0.43 0.00 0.13 1.32 3.42
China 0.12 0.01 0.66 0.00 0.19 1.73 5.06
Colombia 0.12 0.10 0.55 0.02 0.11 2.24 9.22
Comoros 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.01 4.80 24.04
Congo, Rep. 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.07 3.18 11.08
Costa Rica 0.12 0.09 0.32 0.00 0.09 0.63 2.26
Coˆte d’Ivoire 0.03 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.08 2.41 6.80
Denmark 0.11 0.07 0.31 0.00 0.12 0.57 1.74
Dominica 0.06 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.11 1.31 2.76
Dominican Republic 0.21 0.17 0.69 0.02 0.18 1.68 4.95
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.25 0.13 0.88 0.00 0.28 0.73 2.26
El Salvador 0.11 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.18 1.73 4.77
Equatorial Guinea 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.07 3.18 11.08
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Fiji 0.09 0.07 0.24 0.01 0.07 0.77 2.32
Finland 0.07 0.01 0.38 0.00 0.10 1.78 5.83
France 0.07 0.02 0.30 0.00 0.09 0.98 2.87
Gabon 0.01 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.05 4.80 24.04
Gambia, The 0.10 0.07 0.68 0.00 0.14 3.11 13.19
Germany 0.07 0.04 0.23 0.00 0.06 1.61 4.63
Greece 0.09 0.05 0.36 0.00 0.11 1.22 3.34
Grenada 0.04 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.11 2.23 6.66
Guatemala 0.13 0.11 0.65 0.00 0.14 2.20 9.05
Guyana 0.21 0.16 0.71 0.00 0.22 0.91 2.80
Honduras 0.15 0.07 0.69 0.00 0.21 1.64 4.58
Iceland 0.11 0.09 0.39 0.00 0.09 1.47 5.08
India 0.10 0.06 0.61 0.00 0.15 2.35 7.97
Indonesia 0.14 0.06 0.64 0.01 0.19 1.99 5.50
Ireland 0.08 0.03 0.47 0.00 0.12 1.89 5.82
Israel 0.11 0.09 0.40 0.00 0.09 1.57 5.83
Italy 0.10 0.07 0.44 0.00 0.13 1.02 3.11
Jamaica 0.18 0.17 0.43 0.00 0.12 0.30 2.12
Japan 0.06 0.05 0.17 0.00 0.05 0.70 2.37
Jordan 0.07 0.04 0.40 0.00 0.10 1.77 5.49
Kenya 0.10 0.05 0.50 0.00 0.12 2.00 6.98
Korea, Rep. 0.08 0.05 0.30 0.00 0.08 1.10 3.34
Madagascar 0.10 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.08 0.61 2.11
Malaysia 0.14 0.08 0.72 0.00 0.16 1.97 7.17
Maldives 0.11 0.06 0.47 0.00 0.12 1.36 4.26
Mali 0.01 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.05 4.80 24.04
Mauritania 0.12 0.12 0.39 0.00 0.09 0.80 3.84
Mauritius 0.11 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.08 0.76 2.41
Mexico 0.18 0.15 0.58 0.00 0.14 1.12 3.91
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Morocco 0.07 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.07 0.82 2.24
Netherlands 0.09 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.14 1.66 4.93
Nicaragua 0.15 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.24 1.51 3.59
Niger 0.01 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.05 4.07 19.04
Nigeria 0.15 0.11 0.72 0.00 0.17 2.18 7.48
Norway 0.09 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.07 0.99 3.86
Pakistan 0.15 0.15 0.38 0.00 0.12 0.34 2.06
Panama 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . .
Papua New Guinea 0.11 0.09 0.30 0.00 0.09 0.77 2.53
Paraguay 0.16 0.11 0.68 0.00 0.17 2.22 7.27
Peru 0.17 0.14 0.54 0.00 0.14 1.09 3.54
Philippines 0.16 0.14 0.58 0.00 0.15 1.14 3.89
Portugal 0.08 0.02 0.50 0.00 0.13 1.71 5.26
Rwanda 0.10 0.06 0.31 0.00 0.09 0.97 2.98
Samoa 0.08 0.07 0.29 0.01 0.07 1.27 4.88
Saudi Arabia 0.02 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.06 3.74 17.26
Senegal 0.01 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.05 4.80 24.04
Seychelles 0.13 0.08 0.61 0.00 0.17 1.74 5.21
Sierra Leone 0.14 0.10 0.69 0.02 0.15 2.19 7.99
Singapore 0.11 0.07 0.54 0.00 0.13 1.91 6.49
Solomon Islands 0.14 0.08 0.65 0.00 0.17 1.50 4.64
South Africa 0.08 0.08 0.26 0.00 0.06 0.82 3.42
Spain 0.08 0.02 0.40 0.00 0.11 1.33 3.95
Sri Lanka 0.16 0.10 0.45 0.01 0.14 0.72 2.19
St. Lucia 0.05 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.11 1.59 3.57
St. Vincent and 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.07 3.18 11.08
Swaziland 0.01 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.05 4.80 24.04
Sweden 0.08 0.08 0.18 0.01 0.04 0.30 2.85
Thailand 0.10 0.05 0.52 0.00 0.13 2.08 6.69
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Togo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . .
Trinidad and Tobago 0.13 0.01 0.73 0.00 0.19 1.49 4.81
Tunisia 0.10 0.09 0.24 0.01 0.06 0.87 2.65
Turkey 0.09 0.07 0.25 0.01 0.07 0.68 2.18
Uganda 0.15 0.07 0.69 0.00 0.18 1.83 5.89
United Kingdom 0.09 0.05 0.27 0.00 0.08 1.01 2.85
Uruguay 0.16 0.16 0.45 0.01 0.11 0.77 3.18
Venezuela, RB 0.18 0.07 0.72 0.00 0.23 1.54 4.04
Zambia 0.13 0.11 0.53 0.01 0.11 2.05 8.27
Total 0.10 0.05 0.88 0.00 0.13 2.20 8.83
Note: The table reports descriptive statistics of the trilemma implied norm for each
country in the dataset.
Figure A1: The Trilemma Constraint. This figure depicts a particular, linear form of
the trilemma constraint; namely, with the indicators of exchange rate stability, financial
openness, and monetary sovereignty each normalized between zero and one, they sum to
two.
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Figure A2: Countries per Archetype (percent). The figure shows the number of economies
in each year of each type. Throughout much of the modern period, the most common
arrangement in this taxonomy is the ‘China’ type, with its relatively stable exchange
rates and a relatively high degree of monetary sovereignty. The second most common
arrangement type is the ‘Middle.’ The number of ‘Middle’ observations rose through
the early nineties as many ‘China’ type economies began to relax some of their capital
controls. The number of economies of the ‘Hong Kong ’ type has been rising fairly steadily
since the nineties. The number of economies of the ‘U.S.’ type has risen throughout the
period, though less steadily.
